Abstract
Introduction
The issue of defending Distributed Denial of Service(DDoS) [13] attacks have been addressed in recent years. Traditional passive detection methods are inaccurate in the early stages due to their reliance on passively sniffing an attacking signature, an approach that is effective only in later stages when attacking signatures are obvious. There is still a lack of efficient methods for detecting such attacks at an early stage.
Most DDoS attacks exploit Transmission Control Pro- * This work is partially supported by HK Polyu ICRG A-PF86 and CERG Polyu 5196/04E, by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant No. 90104005, and also by TI University Program, NSF ETA 0103709, Texas ARP 009741-0028-2001 and NSF CCR-0309461. tocol(TCP) [9] . In the TCP case, the SYN flooding attack [19, 15] is the most efficient and common-used one which exploits the standard TCP three-way handshake. In the TCP three-way handshake, when the server receives a client's SYNrequest, it replies with a SYN/ACK packet and then waits for the client to send the ACK to complete the three-way handshake. While waiting for the final ACK, the server maintains a half-open connection. Since the SYN flooding attacker always chooses unreachable addresses as the spoofed source addresses of the attacking packets, the server will not receive the anticipated final ACK from the client. Given that the server has limited resource for new connections, it is unable to provide service to the forthcoming connection request.
It is important to detect SYN flooding attacks at an early stage before there are a large number of half-open connections maintained by the protected server. Early detection also allows sufficient time for defense responses such as filtering, pushback and traceback.
To improve detection efficiency, an active approach is preferred to a passive one. Thought traditional passive methods can give accurate detection result at the later stage when attack signatures become evident, they are inaccurate in the early stages due to their reliance on passively sniffing an attacking signature. Given this, an active approach to detection is preferred to announce early DDoS attacks and the delay probing method DARB is proposed in this paper.
An active detection approach begins by determining whether a half-open connection is the result of SYN flooding. The normal half-open connections are usually caused simply by network congestion while half-open connection originated from a SYN flooding attack has no relevancy to the network traffic congestion. If the delay between the server and the client is much longer than the normal delay, the likely cause is a congested router, but if no signs of congestion feature are found, the half-open connection is re-garded as abnormal and maybe the result of a SYN flooding attack.
The delay between the server and the client is estimated using a delay probing method-DARB. By setting different time-to-live(TTL) values at the IP headers, the packets will die at different routers. Information about the death of packets is sent by the relevant router and this provide information for estimating the delay along the path. A score is then given to the delay value which allows an evaluation of the probability of the half-open connection being the result of a SYN flooding attack.
In order to detect SYN flooding attack at its early stage, in this paper we have made the contributions as follows:
• The approach adopts a novel mechanism to ensure detecting SYN flooding attack at its early stage. Our approach is based on the fact that the normal half-open connection maintained inside a server exists as a result of network traffic congestions while the half-open connections caused by a SYN flooding are launched only by attackers.
• The detection method is active and independent. The approach take a more active mechanism to search SYN flooding feature instead of passively sniffing attack signature. Such active approach is deployed at the server side which does not depend on cooperation of other network devices.
• A reliable mechanism with little overhead is applied to probe the delay between the server and the client. Our DARB probing method is a more reliable mechanism than the direct probing method like ping. The selective probing scheme reduce the overhead involved in the proposed detecting technique.
The rest of the paper is organized as follow. Section 2 discusses the related work. Our active detection method will be discussed in Section 3. Section 4 describes a simulation designed to evaluate the performance of the approach. Section 5 offers our conclusion.
Related Work
Defences against DDoS attacks can be classified into three categories: prevention, detection and counterattack. These are three defense strategies against different stages of DDoS attacks. Prevention emphasizes either preemptive measures or the tolerance to attack of the protected server [8, 3, 7] . Detection emphasizes the capturing of intrusion signatures so that an accurate alarm can be raised once an attack has begun. Counterattack schemes, including the filtering [20, 18, 17] , pushback [4] and traceback [11, 14, 16] , seek to mitigate the influence of the DDoS and identify the attack source. Our work is in the area of attack detection. The following outlines relevant approaches.
Schuba gave an analysis of SYN flooding attacks and proposed a Synkill mechanism to detect the condition of a SYN flooding [15] . Having observed a bad or evil IP address, Synkill sends RST packets to the protected server to lessen the impact of the attack. In [19] Wang detected the SYN flooding attacks at leaf routers that connect end hosts to the Internet. Their method is based on the fact that in normal network traffic the SYN and FIN pair should appear symmetrically in normal network traffic. They use a non-parameter CUSUM method to accumulate these pairs. In Cheng's work [5] , their approach utilized the TTL(TimeTo-Live) value in the IP header to estimate the Hop-Count of each packet. Using the Hop-Count deviation, it is possible to distinguish spoofed from normal packets. Peng [12] compiled an IP address database of previous successful connections. When the network is suffering from congestion, an IP address that does not appear in the database seems more suspicious. A more proactive method was presented in [6] and this method applied a aggressive drop policy to identify attack traffic. The drop policies dropped a small number of packets and monitored the transient response from the clients. By comparing the dropping response to that predicted by the formula, it was possible to detect malicious traffic.
The Active Detecting Approach
Our mehtod captures attacking signatures using an active probing method DARB. It obtains the routers delay values by sending packets containing special TTL set at the IP headers 
Analysis of Half-open Connection
A half-open connection is a connection state in which one connection end is established but the other connection end is unreachable or has deposed of its connection information. This state is normally caused by an uncompleted TCP three-way handshake. Half-open connections can also be observed on the victim server during a SYN flooding DDoS attack. The attacker sends the victim server packets with spoofed IP addresses to victim server. The server will accept these 'SYN' requests, turn to the 'syn-received' state and send a 'ACK/SYN' packet to the destination according to the source IP. This type of half-open connection caused by SYN flooding is different from that caused by network congestion. For the server,however, it is hard to tell which is caused by congestion and which by attack. As a result, the victim server will wait until time is out and will try several times by resending 'ACK/SYN' packets. We shall refer to half-open connections of this type as abnormal half-open connections.
The center problem is to distinguish the abnormal halfopen state from the normal half-open state. A basic distinction is that most of normal half-open connections arise from network congestion whereas abnormal half-open connections have nothing to do with congestion. i.e. the delay between the network routers is probably as same as the delay under network normal status. If the half-open connection is caused by congestion, the routing path between the server and the client should show some features of congestion, for example, increased packet delay, a rising packet loss rate, and a near-capacity queue at the congested router.
In our method, the path delay between the server and the client is probed by a method similar to traceroute. A very long delay is regarded as a congestion feature and in this circumstance a half-open connection is considered normal. Otherwise, the half-open will be dealt with as abnormal.
To verify whether the network delay is suitable to be used as the sign of traffic congestion, we probed about 100 web site from Hong Kong and Wuhan respectively hop-by-hop to obtain the delay of network. We found the average delay for a healthy network is about 100ms. Figure 1(a) shows the average hop-by-hop delay values of a healthy network. The delay values of first several hops are always below 20ms, which seems to be zero in the figure, and delay values of middle hops is about 100-200ms. If the probing result is time-out, we use an infinite value to substitute delay value. Time-out results are always found at the last hops of delay probing because the probing packets may be filtered out by the firewall at the server side. Figure 1(b) depicts the delay value of a congested network, which is infected by the worm virus. The clients were informed by ISP that the service might degrade because they were being attacked by some kind of worm virus. The worm virus affected the ISP at the Hop 2 and the average delay after the Hop 2 is is far above 1000ms. From such experiments, we believe the delay value is suitable to distinguish a healthy network from a congested one. 
DARB-the DelAy pRoBing Method
Delay is estimated using a method called DARB(DelAy pRoBing). The DARB traces outgoing paths toward network destinations by sending packets with special time-tolive (TTL) fields in the IP layer and then recording their time of deaths. The IP TTL field limits the lifetime of packets transmitted across the Internet and is decremented by each forwarding device(routers). If the TTL field reaches zero before the destination host is reached, the router drops the offending packets and transmits an ICMP(Internet Control Message Protocol) [1] TTL exceeded in transit error message to the original host, informing the original host of the packet's timeout. If the packet has been created appropriately, the destination host should return a final packet to the original host when the packet reaches its destination. The time-stamps of both the sent-out packets and ICMP-replied packets are recorded to calculate the delay between the original host and each router. The adopted DARB is similar to traceroute method sets TTL values using a selective algorithm, which will be presented in the following paragraph.
There is an important assumption that underlies our probing method: there is no serious network congestion near the victim side at the early stage. As Moore reported [9] , most of DDoS attack durations last from 3-20 minutes. Even if there exists a burst of flooding traffic at the beginning of attack, most of victims can survive for the first several minutes and serious network congestion appears gradually instead of appearing suddenly. We believe DARB can send out probing packets at the early stage when there is no serious network congestion. DARB can get probing results within several seconds which can guarantee the sufficient time to give alarms and take response before DDoS attack becomes serious.
DARB selects special routers along a routing path to probe delays rather than, like traceroute, probing all the routers hop-by-hop. The selection scheme shown in Figure 2 is a binary search algorithm. Since this delay probing will not guarantee successful probing of all routers along the path, the scheme seeks to probe a router as far as possible. The far hop defines the largest TTL value and the packet with this TTL value will hop to the farthest route in probing. The near hop defines the nearest router. Probing process can start from the gateway routers which work for the protected server because we think the protected server could be aware of the congestion status within its Autonomous System. The current hop means the current hop that the packet will traverse. Firstly, the TTL is set large enough to ensure that the packet is able to reach the destination host, which is equal to a 'ping' operation. If an ICMP echo reply message returns, it means the destination is a living host. In a SYN flooding attack, to ensure the attack efficiency, attackers prefer to use unreachable IPs as the spoofed IP. Otherwise, when a living host receives unexpected 'ACK/SYN' from server, it will discard it or send a 'RST' to server. Therefore, a living destination can be safely regarded as the legitimate user. If, on the other hand, there is no direct reply from the destination host, delays will be probed on routers along the path. The probing packet with current hop as the TTL will first seek a successful reply from the correlative router. Upon receiving that, it will probe the farther router. If, however, it fails to get a reply, i.e. the request times out, it will try to probe a nearer router. This probing process will continue until it is possible to probe the available router.
The advantages of using DARB is that it avoids the negative influences of firewalls or gateway filters. The simplest method is to send a ICMP echo request message to the destination as the ping mechanism. However, firewalls and gateways set at some end hosts may filter out an ICMP echo message, which makes the simple ping request unreliable. Alternatively, we use a delay probing method DARB.
A delay value table T delay is built to store the net- work delay values according to internet Autonomous Systems(ASes). After every time interval T , the T delay extracts network delay values from the successive TCP threeway handshakes. It can also actively probe network delay when system is idle and there is a lack of successive handshakes for certain ASes. These delay values are collected in T delay and refreshed at every time interval T . The delay value collection and congestion estimations are performed according to the ASes because the congestion status does not change much within a same AS. With the support from T delay , DARB first searches the table for a specified IP before it probes the network. If a matched delay value is found, which is from the same AS as this IP, the probing process can be omitted to save probing time.
A static size table structure is used in T delay . A dynamic size table structure may be more flexible but may become the potential victim of a DDoS attack. 10k entries are recorded in the table and each entry occupies 32 bits. 24 bits are used to record the first three octets of IP address, which contains enough information to identify an AS. 8 bits of entry is for storing the delay value of probing. The total size of table is about 40k bytes, which does not mean an expensive storage cost for modern computers.
The Probability Estimation
The delay values obtained by the DARB method are used to classify half-open connections as either normal or abnormal. If the returned result by the DARB method has a large delay value, this half-open connection has a high probability to be normal. Whereas a small delay value indicates the network is in a benign traffic status, which does not yield a half-open connection. The tested half-open connection is abnormal and may be caused by a SYN flooding attack.
We first obtain the average network traffic delay when a network runs smoothly. In a time period t, a sample is selected to contain some half-open connections in a server. The sample is denoted as S. Let x i be the delay returned by the DARB method for the ith half-open connection in S. The average delay value x is calculated by
We now provide a function f (x) to evaluate probed delays. Let β = x and x be a random variable to denote the delay value of a half-open connection probed by the DARB method. Thus, f (x) indicates the probability of a half-open connection belonging to abnormal half-open.
The probability density function f (x) is modeled by an exponential distribution because it reflects the relationship between the network traffic delay and the chance of existing of an abnormal half-open connection. When the probed delay by the DARB method is short for a half-open connection, which means x is nearly 0, such connection has a high probability to be an abnormal half-open one from the analysis in Section 3.1.
Active Method to Detect DDoS Attacks at the Early Stage
Not every half-open connection maintained on a protected server is necessary to be probed using the DARB method. Only suspicious half-open connections, which are maintained on the server longer than a predefined time period t that can be adjusted, will be probed. Periodic snapshot of server's half-open connections is captured at every interval t. We denote S T as the snapshot set of half-open connections at time T and S T −t as the set at time T −t. Two adjacent snapshot sets S T and S T −t can be compared. If a half-open appears in both S T −t and S T , we will perform a delay probing for this half-open, i.e., the elements in the intersection S T −t ∩S T will be probed by the DARB method. If there are too many half-open connections in intersection S T −t ∩ S T , a sample will be selected from S T −t ∩ S T and probed.
A threshold T is predefined and used to compare with the probability calculated by f (x). 
Experiment Result
An experiment was designed to evaluate the performance of our detection method. The network topology is simulated using the method presented in [10] . In this experiment, routers are simulated as 110 nodes and each node has a maximum of five edges for connecting with its neighbor routers. Each edge is assigned a weight to stand for the latency between two nodes. One nodes is assumed to be the protected server. Then there exists the shortest path from this server node to each of the other nodes. When the network is uncongested, the weight of each edge is set at no more than 10, which means the delay between two adjacent nodes is less than 10ms. The average latency for all shortest paths is calculated statically and is used to make further comparisons.
The experiment next arranges for nodes to be randomly congested. Once the path that includes these nodes is congested, the delay is increased by a predefined value. The more congested nodes that a path includes, the longer delay it will suffer. If the total delay exceeds a predefined TIME-OUT value, the packet will cause half-open connection on the server node.
At the same time that the nodes are congested, a SYN flooding attack is simulated. The attack randomly selects unreachable IP addresses as the spoofed addresses. Upon receiving spoofed 'SYN' request packets from the attacker, the server replies with 'ACK/SYN'. These 'ACK/SYN' packets are transmitted by the nodes according to the shortest path tree and arrive at the target node. These 'ACK/SYN' request do not, however, receive a corresponding reply from the client. This causes a half-open connec-tion on the server host.
The first experiment determines whether the detection system can distinguish between normal half-open and abnormal half-open, using delay probing to estimate whether a half-open connection is the result of an SYN flooding attack. Figure 3 shows that abnormal half-opens have much higher score than normal half-opens. This makes it easy to classify the half-open as either normal or abnormal. In this experiment, if the probability of being a SYN flooding attack packet exceed 0.5, this half-open is regarded as abnormal. Yet response time delays may also result if the 'ACK/SYN' packet sent to a spoofed address happens to meet a congested router. In such a case, the probability score of an abnormal half-open will be as low as that of a normal half-open and it will bring potential false negatives. But this case does not happen frequently and will not influent the accuracy of result. There are several factors impacting the accuracy of detection and bringing potential false alerts. When the spoofed IP address of an attacking packet happens to meet an actually congested router, our method cannot find this malicious packet. If there is congestion during attacks, the accuracy will be influenced because it is difficult for our method to distinguish the attack from the network congestion. Though these cases do not happen frequently, these will bring some false negatives. Besides congestion and SYN flooding attack, some other reasons to cause the failure of the three-way handshake, such as errors in routers, will also bring potential false positive. More precise mechanism will be studied to give more accurate distinguish between network congestion and SYN flooding attack.
The parameters t, T, N in Section 3.4 is important for the effectiveness of the proposed approach. In experiments, these parameters are decided by experience and maybe are not the optimal. The optimization of these parameters will be part of our future work.
